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In times of economic downturn it is of utmost importance for companies to find 
alternative ways to enhance their value while disregarding all activities that have the 
potential to destroy value. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosures inform 
analysts and investors about companies‟ ethical accountability and engagement towards 
society, possibly contributing to the overall value of a company. This paper examines 
the rapport between different levels of CSR disclosure and stock market performance, 
analyzing  a sample comprised by companies from Portugal, Spain and Italy, given that 
these  are some of the countries most affected by the 2008 financial crisis. The period 
covered ranges from 2008 to 2012. CSR disclosure levels are measured through the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines. Results unveil that markets value a low 
CSR disclosure negatively, but do not find other levels of disclosure to add value, which 
implies that in times of crisis a low CSR disclosure may increase information 
asymmetry between a company and market participants. Furthermore, an analysis of the 
changes in GRI reveals the existence of a positive relation between stock market returns 





 In times of economic downturn, as the one we have been living since the Leman 
Brothers bankruptcy in 2008, companies intensely increase their awareness to develop 
and focus on alternative ways to enhance their value. CSR (corporate social 
responsibility) activities have the potential to restore the markets‟ loss of confidence, 
trigger innovation and stimulate learning, helping companies grow their businesses and 
enhancing their financial value. For these reasons, shareholders and stakeholders have 
been expecting an increase in accountability related to this area. Several studies show a 
positive association between CSR and stock market returns (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001; Preston and O‟Bannon, 1997) but there is no consensus on whether CSR impacts 
firm value and, if it does, on what is the real direction of this rapport.  
 CSR disclosures are considered by investors as their preferred source of 
information regarding companies‟ CSR activities (Radley Yeldar, 2012). The Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) emerged in this context as it aims at providing companies a 
comprehensive sustainability reporting framework, where they can score their level of 
social responsibility with regard to six different organizational areas: Environment, 
Human Rights, Labor Practices & Decent Work, Product Responsibility, Society and 
Economic. The score varies from A to C,  in a way that the highest level of disclosure 
(A) reflects a company that unveils its CSR activities within all the six areas in a highly 
detailed level. On the other hand, the C level reflects a company that reveals its CSR 
commitment in few areas with far less detail. A plus sign is added whenever an external 
party, usually an auditing company, verifies such disclosures.  
 Under the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis stock prices should reflect all 
publicly available information and so, the way markets measure the credibility and 
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informational level of CSR disclosures should impact a company‟s stock price (Ullman, 
1985; Izzo & Donato, 2012). Some studies claim that this relation should be positive, 
since social responsibility disclosures are allied to a firm‟s long-term development 
strategy and performance sustainability (Orlitzky et al. 2003). DeVilliers and Marques 
(2013) are able to corroborate this theory, as they find a positive relation between 
European stock market returns and their respective firms‟ level of CSR, assessed 
through GRI. 
 In this paper I analyze the relation between the stock market performance of 
Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian firms, and their levels of CSR reporting, during the 
current financial crisis. I focus my study on these countries since these were severely 
affected by the crisis. Thus, it is crucial for them to find alternative ways to enhance 
their value and to disregard any activity that is potentially value destructive. I study 
companies that are listed in the respective countries and I hand-collect each company‟s 
disclosure of GRI level from their CSR reports (or annual reports). The same analysis is 
done for the five years under study, 2008-2012.  
 Primarily I focus on analyzing whether higher levels of disclosure are related to 
higher share prices and if, conversely, lower levels of disclosure relate to low share 
prices. This association is expected, as a higher level of disclosure potentially decreases 
information asymmetry between investors and firms, upgrading their reputational risk 
and developing closer relationships with key stakeholders. Low levels, on the other 
hand, may increase information asymmetry and damage a company‟s image and 
reputation which, in times of crisis, is particularly important. Results show that during 
the crisis, while markets do not find higher levels of disclosure value relevant, they find 
them value destructive when disclosed at the lowest level (C). Branco and Rodrigues 
(2008) and Cahan et al. (2012) support that firms engage in CSR disclosures to comply 
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with stakeholder‟s expectations, which may be peculiarly high in times of economic 
downturn due to the lack of confidence and trust in these markets. This theory helps to 
explain why markets do not value any CSR disclosure level, other than the lowest one.  
 Secondly, I examine whether returns are higher for companies that increase their 
CSR disclosure levels on a yearly basis and find evidence to support such hypothesis, as 
results indicate that a statistically significant relationship between stock returns and 
changes in GRI Disclosure Level exist.  In fact and despite the lack of liquidity and 
financial contraction of companies, they have consistently increased their levels of 
disclosure during the financial crisis, indicating that they indeed see these changes as 
beneficial. These findings are consistent with DeVilliers and Marques (2013), who find 
the same rapport to hold in a study focused on the biggest 500 companies in Europe.  
 This paper reveals that, albeit slow, there has been a shift in company‟s purely 
financial focus towards a broader one in which the approximation to society, 
stakeholders and investors is much more fostered. Also it indicates that less developed 
financial markets start to acknowledge such behavior as they price companies 
differently bearing in mind their dissimilar behaviors with regards to CSR disclosures. I 
also find evidence which indicates that, during times of crisis, markets penalize 
companies located in the most affected economies that disclose insufficient CSR-related 
information, while rewarding companies that are able to increase their disclosure level. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes 
the wideness of Corporate Social Responsibility to the particularity of disclosures, 
where the hypotheses aptly arise. Section three depicts the sample gathering process. 
Section four portrays the study‟s methodology. Section five presents the results. Section 





 In the last century, besides increasing shareholders‟ value through profit 
maximization, companies are increasingly dedicating their resources to CSR related 
activities and endeavor to embrace them into their culture and business operations 
aiming at higher social value creation (Yang et al., 2010; KPMG, 2011). Although CSR 
related activities surely translate into societal benefits (Nelling and Webb, 2009), there 
is still no consensus on whether these have the capability to enhance a company‟s 
financial performance, given the multitude of definitions used to describe these concepts 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997; Ullman, 1985) and the different statistical techniques 
employed (Nelling and Webb, 2009; Scholtens, 2008). 
 While some studies find CSR performance to be positively related to Financial 
performance (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Cochran and Wood, 1984; Preston and 
O‟Bannon, 1997), others find this relationship to be negative (Izzo and Donato, 2012) 
and even neutral (Ullman, 1985; Nelling and Webb, 2009). Orlitzky et al. (2003) 
perform the first meta-analysis on this topic and conclude that the majority of the 
studies executed in this arena find a positive relationship between social and financial 
performance, corroborating with the theory that CSR is value relevant for shareholders 
and that its long-term benefits outweigh its short-term costs (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001; Pava and Krausz, 1996). 
 The way markets perceive this CSR accountability may also impact firm‟s stock 
prices (Bowman‟s, 1973). CSR disclosures have thus followed this growing trend as 
they become more noteworthy (O‟Dwyer, 2011; Simnett et al., 2009) since these are 
considered to be the favorite source of information for analysts and investors regarding 
CSR information (Radley Yeldar, 2012). While CSR voluntary disclosure is supposed 
to inform society about enterprises‟ ethical accountability towards key stakeholders 
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(Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Yang et al., 2010), it can also be used to shape a 
company‟s reputation and image in the market (Hooghiemstra, 2000; McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2000; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006), regardless of whether these disclosures 
comply with company‟s real levels of Corporate Social Performance. Therefore the 
trustworthiness behind CSR disclosures is still unclear and it is uncertain whether they 
are opportunistic or informative (Cahan et al., 2013; Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
Under the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis stock prices should reflect all 
publicly available information. Thus, the way equity holders assess the credibility and 
informational level of these disclosures should impact the present value of a firm‟s 
future cash flows and be embedded in their valuation (Mackey and Mackey, 2007; 
Ullman, 1985; Izzo & Donato, 2012).  
 Taib and Ameer (2012) examine the relationship between CSR disclosures, 
using a GRI-based measure, and financial performance in the US and UK and found this 
link to be positive across all GRI levels. However, instead of using stock prices as a 
proxy for financial performance, this study only uses accounting-based measures, which 
may be subject to managerial implications and different accounting procedures. 
DeKlerk et al. (2012) and DeKlerk and DeVilliers (2012) analyze this relationship 
through stock market performance and discover that CSR disclosures have positive 
value relevance on market performance. Yet, these studies focus on single countries, 
which may be limited given that this relationship might be affected by governance 
institutions, democracy and press of freedom (Cahan et al., 2013). Furthermore, all 
these studies fail to analyze the association between different levels of CSR disclosure 
and stock prices since they only account for whether companies disclose CSR 
information or not.  
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 Cahan et al. (2013) examined this relationship using a sample drawn from 22 
countries and Tobin‟s Q as a proxy for financial performance and they find that higher 
levels of CSR disclosure are value added for investors. However, contrarily to the other 
studies employed, this study does not resort to the widely used GRI guidelines to 
analyze CSR disclosures. Instead, it focuses on the KPMG disclosure measure, which 
rates the top 100 firms in 22 countries based on their CSR disclosures. DeVilliers and 
Marques (2013) employ a multi-country approach to analyze the impact of different 
CSR disclosure levels, using GRI guidelines and stock market performance, and find 
CSR disclosures to be value relevant for investors as they impact firms‟ market 
valuation. Their results indicate that it is not only the commencement of CSR reporting 
that influences the market value of firms (Dhaliwal et al., 2011), but likewise the level 
of such disclosures will impact market outcomes differently: high levels of disclosure 
are associated with higher share prices whereas low levels of disclosure are associated 
with lower share prices. This may indicate investors believe that high CSR disclosures 
are reflective of actual CSR performance (Cahan et al., 2013) and might also relate to 
investors‟ expectations concerning the degree of CSR disclosure that a firm is likely to 
unveil; when companies are able to meet these expectations, investors reward them by 
increasing their market valuation (Finch, 2005). This is consistent with the study 
performed by Weber et al. (2005), which examines the connection between GRI 
disclosure levels and the real impact firms have on sustainable development, and finds 
that there is a positive relationship between high disclosure levels and firms‟ corporate 
social responsibility performance. 
This positive premium might also be allied to the fact that higher voluntary CSR 
disclosure levels have the potential to reduce information asymmetry (Cahan et al., 
2013) and minimize the uncertainty regarding a firm‟s reputational risk which may, in 
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turn, increase the market assessment of the firm‟s value. Consequently, it helps a firm to 
develop its relationship with key stakeholders and external actors regarding its 
credibility, reputation and image (Orlitszky et al., 2003; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; 
Hawn and Ioannou, 2012) which creates value for shareholders (Garriga and Melé, 
2004) by assisting in the development of intangible resources that are “valuable, rare 
and cannot be easily imitated” and that bring a competitive advantage for firms, as it 
enables to distinguish themselves from their competition (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008;). 
This potential to reduce information asymmetries may be more advantageous for 
companies in times of crisis given market‟s lack of confidence.  In fact Giannarakis 
(2011), who studies the effect of the 2008 financial crisis in CSR disclosure levels 
through GRI Scores, concludes that during the financial crisis more companies 
voluntarily disclose CSR information and that the level of these disclosures also 
increases during this period. This is against the theory that in periods of recession, 
companies have priorities other than investment in CSR related activities (Ullman, 
1985) and implies that companies view high CSR disclosure levels as a valuable 
resource that allows them to reinforce their relationship with key stakeholders and 
create intangible valuable resources that will positively impact shareholders value and, 
consequently, firm‟s market valuation. However this study fails to address the impact of 
low levels of disclosure during this period. Actually, and despite the sizable body of 
literature regarding CSR related activities, there is a lack of research concerning the 
impact that low levels of disclosure have on financial performance, when compared to 
no disclosure. The only study that we are aware of that analyzes this relationship is 
Marques and De Villiers (2013), who find this interplay to be negative, when examining 
GRI C level disclosures and share price-related information. These results indicate that 
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investors are more likely to value companies that do not disclose any type of CSR 
instead of companies that do so at a lower level, as they may become suspected of 
trying to hide adverse information (Marques and De Villiers, 2013) related to the areas 
that are not disclosed.  
Low levels of disclosure may thus negatively impact corporate reputation, 
worsening firm‟s relations with external stakeholders (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; 
Cahan et al., 2013). Inferior performance in primary stakeholder fields may, 
consequently, influence markets assessment of firm‟s financial performance (Waddock 
and Graves, 1997) and reputational risk, as it might instigate some doubts in market 
participants with respect to firm‟s capability to comply with stakeholders‟ implicit 
expectations (McGuire et al, 1988). Given that firms resort to CSR disclosures as one of 
the informative sources on which stakeholders ground their judgment of a company‟s 
reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006), the inability to 
fulfill these expectations might yield some trepidation in markets and, subsequently, 
increase enterprise‟s risk premium (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Fiori et al., 2007). This 
may in turn decrease the market value of firms. Considering that investors are rational, 
they will embed in their valuations stakeholders‟ adverse reactions to CSR disclosure 
(Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Hamilton, 1995; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996) as these 
can be perceived as agency costs (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2013). Therefore, 
disappointing key stakeholders has the potential to negatively impact firms‟ financial 
performance 
The above discussion leads to the development of the following hypothesis: 




 De-Villiers and Marques (2013) explore the impact that marginal changes in 
CSR disclosure levels may have on stock prices, using GRI guidelines and a sample 
comprising the pre-crisis period, and ascertain that an upward (downward) variation in 
the disclosure level is accompanied by a  higher (lower) share price. Notwithstanding 
the drop in firms‟ profitability during the current financial crisis and the costs related to 
CSR disclosures, such as collecting, compiling, and disseminating information (Ullman, 
1985; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006), there are more companies disclosing higher levels 
of CSR information in this period (Giannarakis, 2011; KPMG, 2011; Mia and Mamum, 
2011).  
 This implies that companies see incremental increases in CSR disclosure as 
value added investments, even in times of an economic downturn, that potentially foster 
their relationship between society and market participants and helps them to reestablish 
markets‟ loss of confidence in businesses and capital markets (Giannarakis, 2011; 
Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). Besides the reputational benefits, rises in the levels of 
disclosures during the financial crisis may also be related to the growing need to attain 
capital markets for additional funding; according to Marques and De Villiers (2013) 
companies that want to do so, are expected to disclose higher CSR levels, so as to 
mitigate uncertainties associated to potential CSR related liabilities. Moreover, 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011), who examines the relationship between firms‟ cost of equity 
capital and voluntary CSR disclosures, finds that firms with superior social 
responsibility disclosure benefit of a subsequent reduction in the cost of equity capital. 
Similarly, these findings might also explain why firms, overall, increase their CSR 
levels in times of crisis.  
 The variety of potential benefits associated with disclosing higher levels of CSR 
during a crisis should be reflected in stock prices and in investors‟ assessment of a 
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firm‟s risk and future cash flows, leading us to the establishment of the second and final 
hypothesis: 
H2: Increases in CSR disclosure levels are related to increases in share prices 
 
Sample 
 My original sample comprises 522 companies, which are based and listed in 
Portugal, Spain, and Italy. This sample was identified via Bloomberg and was chosen so 
as to fully capture the effect of the financial crisis, given the stock exchanges that 
companies belong to and their corresponding countries of origin. Subsequently, and 
following the work of Fiori et al (2007), I disregard enterprises that belong to either the 
financial or utility industry since these have explicit characteristics, rendering industry 
wide comparisons meaningless. Furthermore, I cross the firms that encompass my 
sample with those present on DataStream database (from where we obtain financial 
information) and lose 15 observations. This leaves me with a sample of 341 firms.  
  I collect the GRI level that corresponds to each of the parsed years of my 
sample, relating to the 2008-2012 financial crisis period. For this purpose I analyze the 
CSR reports of these firms, which are available in their websites. If they do not divulge 
such report I next examine their annual reports. 
 Through this research, I must first determine whether there was a GRI disclosure score 
for the given year. If so, I seek for the extent of such disclosure (A, B or C). Also, I 
collect information about whether the GRI disclosure level is assured by a third party, 
and add a plus in those cases. After, I eliminate companies that do not have any 
available information and, from a prospective sample of 1705 observations (341 firm-
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 Based upon the hypotheses developed I estimated two dissimilar equations to 
analyze my unbalanced panel data. This structure is the most apposite given that the 
sample has, simultaneously, a cross-sectional and a time-series dimension and because 
some companies are not observable over the entire five-time period
1
. This model allows 
me to control for unobservable firm-specific variables that do not vary over time, while 
still attaining robust estimators. So as to control for time-varying components, year 
dummies are included in both regression analysis.   
 In order to analyze the first hypothesis, which foresees a positive (negative) 
relationship between high (low) levels of CSR disclosure and share prices, I estimate 
the following regression: 
Share_Pricei,t = β0 + β2 EPSi,t + β3 BV_pS + β4 GRI_disclosure_leveli,t +β5 Leveragei,t  + 
β6 Sales_Growthi,t + β7 Sizei,t + β8 Riski,t + β9 Cap_Expi,t + β10 Profitabilityi,t +               
β11 Fin_Activ + year dummies + ηi + εi,t             (1) 
 The dependent variable, Share_Price, represents the share price three months 
following the end of the fiscal year, once this is how long it takes for both the annual 
and the CSR reports to be divulged. Stock prices are the most suitable metric to explore 
this rapport as they embed the market assessment of the firm‟s future expected cash 
flows, which reflects all long-term relevant information for investors.  Inversely, 
                                                 
1
 This happens due to missing financial or CSR data for some of the years covered. 
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accounting-based measures focus on past performance and are more susceptible to 
differential accounting procedures and managerial manipulation. I apply a modified 
Ohlson (1995) model, which presumes that the market price per share is positively 
related with the amount of earnings per share and the book value per share. Hence, the 
EPS and BV_pS variables are included in the regression model. GRI_disclosure_level is 
the regression‟s variable of interest, which is decomposed into six indicator variables, 
GRI_A+, GRI_A, GRI_B+, GRI_B, GRI_C+ and GRI_C, given its ordinal nature. These 
are coded as one when they correspond to the firm‟s GRI level of compliance on that 
year and zero otherwise. So as to avert the onset of perfect multicollinearity, the 
category comprised by companies that do not disclose any GRI-related information is 
omitted, and so this is the base group for the corresponding analysis.  
 Cahan et al. (2013) stress the size and leverage effect on stock prices, when 
analyzing CSR disclosures, and so these two variables are controlled for. Size is 
measured via the natural logarithm of the company‟s market capitalization (the market 
value of the company‟s shares at the end of the fiscal year), while Leverage is given by 
the ratio between the total debt and total assets, at the same point in time. Profitability is 
also one of the key features that affects the market valuation of a firm (Fiori et al., 
2007). According to Weber et al. (2005) it should be measured through a company‟s 
Return on Equity, as it reflects the amount of profit an enterprise is able to engender 
given the resources delivered by its stockholders. Profitability is thus added and 
computed as the ratio between the fiscal year‟s after-tax income and the book value of 
equity. A company‟s yearly sales growth is also introduced into the regression model, in 
comparison to the prior fiscal year amount. The significance of Sales_Growth relies on 
the fact that it may be symptomatic of a company‟s prospective future earning streams 
(Fiori et al., 2007). Centered in the researches of Ullman (1985) and Xueming Luo and 
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Bhattacharya (2006), who point out the importance that innovation has on investors‟ 
evaluations of firms, the indicative Cap_Exp variable is included with the intend to 
measure a firm‟s R&D intensity, coded as 1 if the firm invested in R&D during the 
corresponding year, and zero otherwise
2
. A Risk variable is also enclosed owing to the 
effect it has on market performance. This is measured as the volatility of stock prices 
through the standard deviation of returns. As it is of paramount importance for investors 
to understand how firms finance their recurrent activities and if they are able to do so 
only by reinvesting their earnings, we add the variable Fin_Activ. This is computed as 
the difference between sales and purchases of common and preferred shares plus change 
in long term debt. Year dummies are also appended to the regression as they capture 
year specific traits that might drive a firm‟s market value. Conversely, all company-
specific but time-invariant effects, such as the country or the industry where a company 
belongs to, are encapsulated through the inclusion of a random variable, ηi. Lastly, the 
disturbance term εi,t captures random and unexpected shocks.  
 For the second hypothesis, which envisages that upsurges (reductions) in CSR 
disclosure levels are positively (negatively) valued by market participants, the 
regression computed is as follows: 
RET i,t = β0 + β2 Change_EPSi,t + β3 Change_BV_pSi,t + β4 Change_GRI i,t + β5 
Leveragei,t  + β6 Sales_Growthi,t + β7 Sizei,t + β8 Riski,t + β9 Cap_Expi,t + β10 
Profitabilityi,t + β11 Fin_Activ + year dummies + ηi + εi,t (2) 
 The dependent variable RET epitomizes a company‟s stock return, calculated by 
parceling the difference between the stock price three months after the fiscal year ended 
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and the stock price on the same day of the previous year, excluding any dividends or 
capital gains. Returns are chosen in this hypothesis since they reflect the stock 
appreciation relatively to previous year, which should reveal all significant changes in 
investor‟s awareness of the firm‟s intrinsic value. As in the first premise, the Ohlson 
(1995) model is employed but as we consider returns as the independent variable, we 
now substitute Book Value per Share and the Earnings per Share variables with their 
yearly variation, captured by the following variables: Change_BV_pS and Change_EPS. 
Herein the variable of concern is Change_GRI which represents the alteration in GRI 
disclosure level in relation to the preceding year, resulting in the loss of all observations 
in the first year of the sample. This variable may adopt a value from -3 to +3, reflective 
of the extent of such variation. Contrarily to the first research design, we do not 
differentiate the external assurance within the GRI Level since these were almost nil. 




As presented in Figure 1, the sample is majorly comprised by Italian companies as this 
is the country that has, simultaneously, the oldest stock exchange and the largest 
number of publicly listed companies
3
. Contrariwise, Portugal is the country with the 
lowest number of firms (11%).  The industry distribution presented in Figure 2 shows 
                                                 
3




that the weights of the different sectors in the whole sample range from 3% (healthcare 
industry) to 31% (consumer discretionary), consistent with different countries‟ hefts.
 4
  
 Table 1 shows the distribution of GRI scores collected. It indicates that, in my 
sample, enterprises did not embrace the GRI Guidelines during the financial crisis 
period, as other less affected countries did (KPMG, 2011). The data indicates that 84% 
of the entire sample does not disclose any GRI-related information, reflecting a lack of 
awareness of the importance of CSR related activities, something Izzo & Donato (2012) 
stress. Among those who follow these principles, companies tend to divulge the highest 
level (11% for A+) and the frequency of such disclosures prolapses in parallel with the 
drawdown of the GRI level (close to 0% for C). Although Spain is the nation that most 
releases GRI, this trend is unswerving across countries (Figure 3), suggesting that 
companies indeed perceive some and the same dissimilarity between the different 
levels. Figure 4 shows that the same holds for the various industries that encompass the 
sample, reinforcing the previous argument.  
 Notwithstanding the generalized low adoption of GRI, as shown in Figure 5 and 
consistent with Giannarakis (2011) findings, there is a tendency, albeit slow, for 
companies to disclose more GRI-related information and for this level of disclosure to 
increase as the financial crisis wades: the A+ level adoption increases from 8% to more 
than 12%, which corresponds to roughly the same increase as the overall level of 
disclosures. Contrarily, the lowest levels of C+ and C remain fairly constant at 1% and 
0.4%, respectively. Uniquely in 2009 there is a minimal increase in companies that do 
not disclose, probably related to the outburst of the crisis and the sudden financial 
contraction of firms. Interestingly, the major difference is seen in 2010 in which the 
level of companies that do not disclose decreases towards an increase of the GRI A+ 
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level of over 4%, showing companies‟ attempt to eliminate any information 
lopsidedness triggered by the burst of the crisis. Figure 6 shows that this trend is 
steadier in both Spain and Italy as opposite to Portugal, which is more uneven given that 
the latest was the country most strongly affected by the economic downturn. Yet, this is 
the country that mostly increases its level of disclosures from 7% of A+ level in 2008 to 
circa 17% in 2012. Untabulated results show that, in the latter year, from the companies 
that adopted the GRI Guidelines, all disclosed the A+ Level.   
 Descriptive statistics on key and control variables included in both research 
equations are displayed in Table 2. Results show that, despite the economic crisis, these 
companies are able to grow in terms of sales, with an average value of 5%. Yet this 
growth was majorly financed with debt, as the Financing Activities average is of 12.6%. 
Risk ranges from 0% to a maximum of 1682% and presents a mean of 39.5% indicating 
that these are assessed as very risky companies. Also their mean and median returns 
edge below zero, reflective of the financial crisis and investors‟ uncertainty on these 
markets.  
 Pearson correlation matrix, presented in Table 3, supports our first hypothesis as 
the correlation between GRI A and GRI A+ level are positive related with share prices, 
while GRI C level is negatively. However, and as presented in the same table, the p-
value is only significant for the highest level (GRI A+), not supporting the view that 
lower levels yield lower share prices. Remarkably, size and sales growth seem to be 
positively and significantly correlated with the highest levels of GRI disclosure (p-
values around 0%) supporting Pava and Krausz (1996) view of a vicious circle 
existence. On the other hand, results do not support our second hypothesis as the p-





 To properly deal with unbalanced panel data I first estimate both a fixed effects 
model and a random effects model. Once analyzing the existence of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity in both models under both hypotheses, adjusted Driscoll and Kraay 
(1998)
5
 standard errors are employed. This allows controlling for both effects, as their 
presence would yield inefficient estimates and lead to erroneous conclusions. 
Afterwards, Hausman tests are performed so as to indicate which model is the most 
adequate given the characteristics of the sample data. Under this test, the null hypothesis 
is that company-specific traits are not significantly correlated with the explanatory 
variables and so there is no need to employ a model that controls for them, like the fixed 
effects one. If this does not hold and the null hypothesis is rejected, than the random 
effects model cannot be employed as it yields inconsistent estimates, grounded on 
improper assumptions. Test results show that the null hypothesis is rejected for both 
models, when considering a 1% significance level, professing that the fixed effects 
approach is the most apposite to apply. Thus, this is the model I use in my analyses. 
Given that it controls for firm-specific time-invariant effects, year dummies are included 
in both models so as to capture all time-variant effects. 
 Table 4 unveils the results of estimating equation 1. I find that, although 
financial markets do not consider high levels of GRI disclosure value relevant during 
the crisis, they find these to be value destructive at their lowest level. This does not 
support part of the first hypothesis, which foresees a positive association between high 
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GRI levels and stock market performance, but it validates the theory that there is a 
negative relationship between the lowest level and stock market performance, since the 
coefficient for the GRI C level is negative and statistically significant at a 5% 
significance level. Thus, firms in these countries that disclose GRI C level information 
during the financial crisis have lower share prices than firms that do not disclose.  
 DeVilliers and Marques (2012) claim that the positive association between high 
levels of disclosure and share prices is more prominent in countries with higher levels 
of democracy, regulatory quality and government effectiveness, in which investors are 
better placed to express their concerns resulting in regulation and government increase 
in effectiveness. Izzo and Donato (2012) argue that less developed stock markets, and 
specifically the Italian one, are not mature enough and well advanced to properly 
appraise the positive value embedded in such releases. Both arguments may explain the 
lack of significance found in high CSR disclosure levels included in my sample. 
Furthermore, Branco and Rodrigues (2008) and Cahan et al. (2012) support that firms 
engage in CSR disclosures to obey stakeholder‟s norms and expectations, which may be 
abnormally high in times of economic downturn due to the lack of confidence and trust 
in these markets. Thus, investors do not value GRI A, nor GRI B level, since it complies 
with their high expectations. Results support such theories and indicate that, during 
times of crisis, adopting high levels of CSR disclosure is an insufficient condition for 
companies located in the most affected economies to increase their stock valuations.  
 Notwithstanding, our findings support the theory that disclosing at the GRI C 
level results in a lower share price when compared to no disclosure. This is consistent 
with the findings of DeVilliers and Marques (2012) and with Fiori et al.‟s (2007) theory 
that a meager CSR disclosure increases a firm risk and worsens its reputation and 
relationship with its several stakeholders, being value destructive for investors. This has 
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the potential to worsen in times of economic downturn due to the generalized lack of 
confidence in the markets and companies, supporting our findings. However, results 
also reveal that when this level is assured by a third party, usually an auditing company, 
the statistical significance of the variable disappears (p-value=0.472). Thus, market 
fears are no longer presented when such reports are revised. In fact, results presented in 
Table 3 show that the p-value of the correlation of GRI A+ and B+ levels with share 
prices is significant at 5%, and that significance is no longer present when the same 
levels are disclosed but not assured. This implies that markets only value these reports, 
regardless of the level disclosed, if they have an outer acknowledgment of the 
trustworthiness behind them.  
 In this equation, the Ohlson (1995) model holds as the EPS and BVpS variables 
are both statistically significant at a 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. Also 
and validating Ulman (1985) theory, Capital Expenditures seem to have an important 
role on investor‟s valuation of firms as this variable has a positive statistically 
significant impact on share prices. Finally, and upholding on what the research on the 
topic suggests, Leverage Size and Risk are all statistically significant independent 
variables. 
 The second hypothesis examines whether financial markets find changes in GRI 
Disclosure levels value relevant. The results in Table 5 corroborate with the hypothesis 
developed, as the coefficient for Changes in GRI level is positive and statistically 
significant, at a 1% confidence level. Thus, returns in these periods are higher for 
companies that increased their level of disclosure, as opposite to companies who 
decreased it, since they enjoyed lower returns. Notice, however, that we do not consider 
changes within the same GRI level (from assurance to non-assurance) but instead 
changes between levels and no disclosure, as the former were almost nil. These results 
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are consistent with DeVilliers and Marques (2012), who found that changes in GRI 
levels are positively associated with the share prices from the 500 largest European 
companies and may explain why the considered firms consistently increased their GRI 
Levels during the analyzed periods.   
.  So as to make a country-wide comparison, we run both research designs for each 
country analyzed and find that these markets value disclosures and changes in such 
disclosures differently. Untabulated results show that Portugal is the only country which 
positively and significantly values all GRI disclosure levels, as well as changes in such 
disclosures. Being the country in our sample most affected by the financial crisis, these 
last results suggests that in times of economic crisis some markets indeed give value 
relevance to companies that fully embrace CSR-related activities. 
 
Conclusion 
During times of crisis, it is of paramount importance for companies to find 
alternate ways to enhance their value while disregarding activities that may potentially 
destroy it. This paper attempts to answer this question as it analyzes the association 
between different levels of CSR disclosure and stock market performance during the 
2008 financial crisis of some of the countries that were most affected: Portugal, Italy 
and Spain. Thus, it focuses on the 2008-2012 period, resorting to a sample comprised by 
1259 observations using the GRI Guidelines to measure CSR performance. 
 It first examines if dissimilar levels of CSR disclosure impact stock prices 
differently and finds that markets do not see any value in high levels of CSR disclosure 
but that companies consistently increase their disclosure levels during the crisis 
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probably because divulging at the lowest level causes a negative reaction on financial 
markets, a theory that our findings support. Furthermore, it examines the impact that 
changes in CSR disclosure levels may have on stock market returns and find these to be 
positively related with higher returns. In fact this study finds that Portuguese 
companies, located in the country in our sample most affected by the crisis, consistently 
increased their disclosure levels during the period analyzed reaching a null value for the 
lowest level in 2012. Nevertheless our study shows that the majority of firms still not 
disclose any CSR-related information (only 16% of our sample does so) indicating that, 
despite there has been an increasing concern towards CSR disclosures,  there is still a 
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Figure 4 Breakdown of Disclosure by Industry 
 
Figure 5 Disclosure Evolution  
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Table 1 Breakdown by GRI Disclosure 
GRI Disclosure 
No GRI 1,055 84% 
A+ 135 11% 
A 13 1% 
B+ 30 2% 
B 12 1% 
C+ 8 1% 
C 6 0% 





Table 2 Descriptive statistics of key and control variables 
 
Average St.Deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
Stock Price 6,184 9,334 2,660 0 100,550 
Returns -0,042 0,476 -0,100 -1 3,852 
EPS 0,126 3,200 0,100 -85,788 18,380 
BVpS 4,626 6,760 2,262 -2,233 63,723 
Change_EPS 0,157 3,132 0,177 -85,788 18,380 
Change_BVpS 0,882 6,543 0,155 -71,650 51,545 
GRI_A+ 0,107 0,310 0 0 1 
GRI_A 0,010 0,101 0 0 1 
GRI_B+ 0,024 0,153 0 0 1 
GRI_B 0,010 0,097 0 0 1 
GRI_C+ 0,006 0,079 0 0 1 
GRI_C 0,005 0,069 0 0 1 
Change_GRI 0,004 0,381 0 -3 3 
Lev 0,313 0,186 0,302 0,000 1,486 
Profitability 0,103 1,794 0,045 -8,335 42,821 
Size 2,337 0,805 2,234 0,270 4,950 
SalesGrowth 0,052 0,558 0,139 -0,990 17,412 
FinAct 0,126 4,528 0,009 -34,906 83,081 
CapExp 0,180 0,384 0 0 1 
Risk 0,395 0,804 0,161 0 16,828 
Where:      
STOCK PRICE = market price per share three months after fiscal year ended; 
RETURNS =  return between the stock price three months after the fiscal year ended and 
the stock price on the same day of the previous year; 
EPS =Earnings per Share at the end of fiscal year; 
BVpS =Book Value per Share at the end of fiscal year; 
CHANGE_EPS = Earnings per share variation when compared to previous fiscal year; 
CHANGE_BVPS = Book Value per Share variation when compared to previous fiscal 
year; 
GRI_LEVEL =Incorporates six indicator variables (GRI_A+, GRI_A, GRI_B+, GRI_B, 
GRI_C+, GRI_C) coded as one when they correspond to the firm’s GRI level of 
compliance on that year and zero otherwise; 
CHANGE_GRI = Change in GRI level applied since last year and ranges from -3 to 3, 
such that GRI_A=3, GRI_B=2, GRI_C=1 and no GRI=0; 
LEV = ratio of total debt to total assets; 
PROFITABILITY = ratio of fiscal year’s after-tax income and book value of equity; 
SIZE = natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year; 
SALESGROWTH = Sales variation, when compared to previous fiscal year; 
FINACT = Sales less purchases of common and preferred shares plus change in long term 
debt; 
CAPEXP = Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm invested in R&D and zero otherwise; 









Returns GRI_A+ GRI_A GRI_B+ GRI_B GRI_C+ GRI_C Change                         
GRI 





Stock Price 1 
               
Returns 0.201 1               
GRI_A+ 0.227 0.040 1              
GRI_A 0.014 -0.004 -0.035 1             
GRI_B+ 0.049 0.021 -0.054 -0.016 1            
GRI_B -0.004 0.092 -0.034 -0.010 -0.015 1           
GRI_C+ -0.016 -0.008 -0.027 -0.008 -0.012 -0.007 1          
GRI_C -0.001 -0.009 0.024 -0.007 -0.011 -0.006 -0.005 1         
Change_GRI 0.019 0.026 0.021 0.052 0.155 -0.027 0.3024 0.226 1        
Lev -0.235 -0.112 0.056 0.024 -0.040 0.009 -0.034 -0.009 -0.017 1       
Profitability 0.024 0.135 0.0173 -0.002 -0.000 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 1      
Size 0.450 0.186 0.483 0.103 0.177 0.097 0.038 0.007 0.052 -0.105 0.005 1     
SalesGrowth 0.039 -0.054 -0.010 0.237 -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 0.003 -0.018 -0.007 -0.002 0.062 1    
FinAct 0.093 -0.004 0.050 0.034 0.004 0.005 0.004 -0.021 0.018 0.012 0.015 0.052 0.135 1   
CapExp 0.094 0.053 0.085 -0.047 0.116 -0.003 0.014 -0.002 0.067 -0.069 -0.009 0.260 0.016 0.036 1  
Risk 0.652 0.104 0.167 0.002 0.041 -0.004 0.022 -0.006 0.007 -0.148 0.016 0.280 0.037 0.136 0.062 1 
 The correlations in bold are statistically significant at a 10% significance level 
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 FE Coefficients White t-stats 
Constant -13.070 -32.54 *** 
EPS 0.047  -2.46 ** 
BVpS 0.492  14.88  *** 
GRI_A+ -0.094   -0.30 
GRI_A -0.439   -1.43 
GRI_B+ -0.386   -1.19 
GRI_B 0.021    0.15 
GRI_C+ -0.401   -0.79 
GRI_C -0.406   -3.01  ** 
Lev 2.459    2.38  ** 
Profitability 0.021    0.51 
Size 6.590    23.69 *** 
SalesGrowth -0.034   -1.65    
FinAct 0.033    1.23 
CapExp 0.311    2.47 ** 
Risk 2.098  6.71 *** 
Year Dummies Included  
F-test for model 3.87 (p-value = 0.098) 
R
2 34.73%  
Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) 
confidence level, respectively, in a two-tailed t-test, are shown  
above (see Equation 1)  
 FE Coefficients White t-stats 
Change_EPS 0.005  1.42 
Change_BVpS 0.003  4.80 *** 





 21.04 *** 
-0.05 
Size 0.264  3.29 *** 
SalesGrowth 0.057  2.21 ** 
FinAct -0.003 -4.67 *** 
CapExp -0.121 -1.16 
Risk 0.091   3.54 *** 
F-test for model 4.28 (p-value = 0.128) 
R
2
 41.09%  
Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) 
confidence level, respectively, in a two-tailed t-test, are shown above 
(see Equation 2)  
